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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge. 
 
The issue in this case is whether District Court of the 
Virgin Islands, Appellate Division erred by ordering 
sanctions against a party and his attorney thirty months 
after it entered a final order. The Appellate Division had 
jurisdiction over the appeal from the decision of the Virgin 
Islands Territorial Court under V.I. Code Ann. tit. 4, S 33. 
We have jurisdiction over the appeal of the final order of the 
Appellate Division under 48 U.S.C. S 1613a(c). We conclude 
that the Appellate Division erred and will reverse. 
 
I. Background 
 
In 1989, Jeffrey Prosser sued for divorce from his wife 
Margaret Prosser in the Territorial Court of the Virgin 
Islands. The Prossers negotiated a settlement agreement, 
which was approved by the court. On March 22, 1990, the 
court entered a Final Decree of Divorce into which the 
written property settlement agreement was merged. 
 
Jeffrey failed to make a $2,500,000 payment as required 
by the divorce decree. Thereafter, Margaret filed a Praecipe 
requesting that the Territorial Court issue a Writ of 
Execution for the entire amount, plus interest. See V.I. 
Code Ann. tit. 5, S 471 (authorizing the issuance of writs of 
execution by the Territorial Court). The Territorial Court 
issued the writ. Jeffrey filed a motion to vacate the writ of 
execution, which the Territorial Court denied. Jeffrey then 
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appealed to the District Court of the Virgin Islands, 
Appellate Division. 
 
On April 18, 1996, the Appellate Division denied Jeffrey's 
appeal. Finding that the appeal lacked merit, the court 
noted that it was considering awarding fees and costs to 
Margaret under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38 (as 
to Jeffrey) and 28 U.S.C. S 1927 (as to Jeffrey's counsel, 
Kevin Rames), and asked for additional briefing on the 
issues. Soon thereafter, however, the Prossers settled the 
case, and Jeffrey paid Margaret the $2,500,000, plus all 
interest, costs, and attorney's fees. 
 
On November 4, 1998, more than two and a half years 
after its final order, the Appellate Division issued a 
Memorandum Opinion and Order fining Jeffrey $20,000 
and Rames $5000 in the nature of a sanction, relying on 
the court's inherent power to punish litigants and their 
attorneys for abuse of process. Jeffrey and Rames appealed.1 
 
We review the Appellate Division's sanction award for 
abuse of discretion. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 
32, 55, 111 S. Ct. 2123, 2138 (1991). "An abuse of 
discretion is a clear error of judgment, and not simply a 
different result which can arguably be obtained when 
applying the law to the facts of the case." In re Tutu Wells 
Contamination Litig., 120 F.3d 368, 387 (3d Cir. 1997) 
(citations omitted). 
 
II. Discussion 
 
A. Timing 
 
As noted above, the Appellate Division invoked its 
inherent power2 to impose the sanctions on Jeffrey and his 
counsel approximately thirty months after rendering its 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. As part of the settlement agreement, Margaret agreed to take no 
position on sanctions and she did not participate in this appeal. 
 
2. In its Memorandum Opinion, the Appellate Division stated that it was 
only relying on its inherent power "to the extent that [its] authority 
under Rule 38 and section 1927 need[ed] supplementation." However, as 
noted in Part I.B., neither Rule 38 nor section 1927 supplied the 
necessary authority for the type of sanctions issued in this case. 
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final decision on the merits. Our precedent concerning Rule 
11 sanctions helps guide our review here. In Mary Ann 
Pensiero, Inc. v. Lingle, 847 F.2d 90, 92 (3d Cir. 1988), we 
adopted a supervisory rule requiring parties tofile all 
motions for Rule 11 sanctions before entry of the court's 
final order. See also Mellon Bank Corp. v. First Union Real 
Estate, 951 F.2d 1399, 1413 (3d Cir. 1991); Hilmon Co. v. 
Hyatt Int'l, 899 F.2d 250, 251 n.1 (3d Cir. 1990). 
 
We extended this rule to apply to courts considering Rule 
11 sanctions in Simmerman v. Corino, 27 F.3d 58 (3d Cir. 
1994). In Simmerman, we reversed the district court's sua 
sponte imposition of Rule 11 sanctions because the order 
was issued three months after the entry of the final order. 
Following the logic of Pensiero, we held that a district court 
should raise and resolve sua sponte Rule 11 sanctions 
issues "prior to or concurrent with its resolution of the 
merits of the case." Id. at 63. We opined that such a rule 
would not greatly increase the burdens faced by the district 
courts because the dictates of due process "should not 
necessitate prolonged consideration in the district court" to 
assess sanctions once a violation has been established. Id. 
(quoting Pensiero, 847 F.2d at 99). We also noted the 
beneficial impact that such a rule would have on judicial 
resources: 
 
       In the district court, resolution of the issue before the 
       inevitable delay of the appellate process will be more 
       efficient because of current familiarity with the matter. 
       Similarly, concurrent consideration of challenges to the 
       merits and the imposition of sanctions avoids the 
       invariable demand on two separate appellate panels to 
       acquaint themselves with the underlying facts and the 
       parties' respective legal positions. 
 
Id. (quoting Pensiero, 847 F.2d at 99). 
 
We continued: 
 
       [t]here is no reason why prompt action should be 
       required of an opposing party and yet not similarly 
       required of the court. At the time that the court 
       decided the motions for summary judgment and 
       dismissal, it had before it the identical information that 
       it relied upon three months later in imposing the 
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       sanctions. Nothing was to be gained by delay. If 
       sanctions had truly been appropriate, the court should 
       have imposed them at that time. Their imposition three 
       months later was an abuse of discretion. 
 
Id. at 63-64 (footnote omitted). 
 
We see no reason to limit the logic of Simmerman  to sua 
sponte Rule 11 sanctions.3 See Langer v. Presbyterian Med. 
Ctr., 1995 WL 395937, *3 (E.D. Pa. July 3, 1995) (relying 
on Simmerman and Pensiero to vacate court's own tardy 
award of attorney's fees under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 26(g) and section 1927). The interests of judicial 
efficiency, timeliness, and notice are no different when 
imposing sanctions under the court's inherent power. At 
the time of its final order on the merits, the Appellate 
Division possessed the same evidence of the conduct that it 
had when it issued its sanction order two and a half years 
later. The same rationale that supported the invalidation of 
the Rule 11 sanction entered three months after thefinal 
order in Simmerman supports the invalidation of the 
inherent power sanction here, which was entered over 
thirty months after the final order. 
 
Sanctions ideally operate as instructional tools to deter 
parties and attorneys whose conduct has not met the 
requisite professional standards from continuing on their 
wayward course of conduct. This exemplary function is ill 
served when sanctions are delayed. During the course of a 
delay, memories can fade and, importantly, attorneys and 
parties may continue to misbehave because they do not 
have the benefit of disciplinary guidance from the court.4 If 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Certainly, a court retains its power to sanction under its inherent 
power for abuses which occur or are discovered after the entry of the 
final order. See Chambers, 501 U.S. at 56, 111 S. Ct. at 2138-39 (citing 
Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 395-96, 110 S. Ct. 2447, 
2455-56 (1990), for the proposition that sanctions, even under Rule 11, 
may properly be imposed years after the final judgment on the merits). 
4. Although we need not address the merits of the sanctions here, we feel 
the need to remind the Appellate Division that "[b]ecause of their very 
potency, inherent powers must be exercised with restraint and 
discretion." Chambers, 501 U.S. at 44, 111 S. Ct. at 2132. A court 
cannot be motivated by vindictiveness or retribution when issuing 
sanctions. Indeed, courts must fight the temptation to find all losing 
arguments frivolous, and should only award sanctions in cases in which 
they are clearly justified. 
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sanctions based on the court's inherent power were truly 
appropriate in this case, the Appellate Division should have 
imposed them when it issued its final order. The Appellate 
Division's order will be reversed. 
 
B. Particularized Notice 
 
Although the timeliness issue is dispositive, we feel that 
to fulfill our instructional function it is incumbent on us to 
comment upon another troubling aspect of the Appellate 
Division's sanctions order. Fundamental fairness and the 
established law of this circuit require that a court afford the 
parties due process by giving them notice and opportunity 
to be heard before imposing sanctions or awarding 
damages. See  Jones v. Pittsburgh Nat'l Corp., 899 F.2d 
1350, 1357 (3d Cir. 1990). "The party against whom 
sanctions are being considered is entitled to notice of the 
legal rule on which the sanctions would be based, the 
reasons for the sanctions, and the form of the potential 
sanctions." In re Tutu Wells, 120 F.3d at 379 (citing 
Simmerman, 27 F.3d at 64). Here, the notice given by the 
Appellate Division was insufficient because the parties were 
not on notice that the sanctions would be based on the 
court's inherent power, nor were they warned of the 
possibility that the sanction might be in the form of a fine 
payable to the court. 
 
Due process requires that the parties have sufficient 
notice of the form of the sanctions being considered by the 
court because the issues that must be addressed may differ 
depending on the form. See id. at 380 (citing Gagliardi v. 
McWilliams, 834 F.2d 81 (3d Cir. 1987) (per curiam)). The 
sanction imposed by the Appellate Division was in the 
nature of a monetary fine payable to the court. Although a 
court may impose a fine under its inherent power, see id. at 
383, neither Jeffrey nor Rames had been given any notice 
that the court was considering this type of sanction. As to 
Jeffrey, the Appellate Division indicated in its original order 
that it was only considering awarding costs and fees to 
Margaret as damages under Federal Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 38.5 In Rames's case, the court indicated only 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Rule 38 states: 
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that it was considering sanctions under section 1927 6 for 
excess costs. Instead, the court imposed a $20,000fine 
against Jeffrey and a $5000 fine against Rames. 
 
Moreover, the sanction imposed, a monetary fine payable 
to the court, is not an allowable remedy under either 
section 1927 or Rule 38. Under section 1927, courts may 
order attorneys to personally satisfy "the excess costs, 
expenses, and attorneys' fees."7 Section 1927 does not, 
however, allow courts to impose a fine without articulating 
a basis for the amount. Like Rule 38, section 1927 only 
allows the court to award costs and attorney fees payable 
to the opposing party, not payable to the court. See Laitram 
Corp. v. Cambridge Wire Cloth Co., 919 F.2d 1579, 1584 
(Fed. Cir. 1990). 
 
Rule 38 is even more clear. It does not provide for 
sanctions at all. It allows one who has sufferedfinancial 
detriment from having to defend a legitimate judgment 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       If a court of appeals determines that an appeal is frivolous, it 
may, 
       after a separately filed motion or notice from the court and 
       reasonable opportunity to respond, award just damages and single 
       or double costs to the appellee. 
 
Fed. R. App. P. 38 (emphasis added). 
 
6. Section 1927 states: 
 
       Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court 
       of the United States or any Territory thereof who so multiplies the 
       proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be 
       required by the court to satisfy personally the excess costs, 
       expenses, and attorneys' fees reasonably incurred because of such 
       conduct. 
 
28 U.S.C. S 1927. 
 
7. The Appellate Division couched its sanction in terms of the "harm to 
the judicial system." This is not the type of harm Congress intended to 
address through section 1927. The "excess costs" allowable as a sanction 
under 1927 are limited to those costs enumerated under 28 U.S.C. 
S 1920. See Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 757-59, 100 
S. Ct. 2455, 2459-62 (1980). Under section 1920, excess costs do not 
include fines for "harm done to the judicial system" as relied upon by the 
Appellate Division. 
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against a frivolous appeal, to recover fees and costs as 
"damages." Moreover, the text of Rule 38 itself limits the 
award of damages to the financially injured party, not the 
court. 
 
III. Conclusion 
 
In sum, the Appellate Division, by entering a sanctions 
order approximately two and a half years after itsfinal 
order, by imposing a monetary fine payable to the court, 
which is not an allowable remedy under either section 1927 
or Rule 38, and by failing to inform the parties of its 
intention to use its inherent power, erred. Hence, we will 
reverse its order of November 4, 1998. 
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